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successful intervention (among many that failed). The “winning” intervention reduced collective blame of
Muslims by highlighting hypocrisy in the ways individuals collectively blame Muslims—but not other
groups (White Americans, Christians)—for individual group members’ actions. After replicating the effect
in an independent sample, we demonstrate that a novel interactive activity that isolates the psychological
mechanism amplifies the effectiveness of the collective blame hypocrisy intervention and results in
downstream reductions in anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Muslim behavior.
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Abstract
Collectively blaming groups for the actions of individuals can license vicarious retribution. Acts of terrorism by Muslim
extremists against innocents, and the spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes against innocent Muslims that follow, suggest that
reciprocal bouts of collective blame can spark cycles of violence. How can this cycle be short-circuited? After establishing a
link between collective blame of Muslims and anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior, we used an “interventions tournament” to
identify a successful intervention (among many that failed). The “winning” intervention reduced collective blame of Muslims
by highlighting hypocrisy in the ways individuals collectively blame Muslims—but not other groups (White Americans,
Christians)—for individual group members’ actions. After replicating the effect in an independent sample, we demonstrate
that a novel interactive activity that isolates the psychological mechanism amplifies the effectiveness of the collective blame
hypocrisy intervention and results in downstream reductions in anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Muslim behavior.
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. . . until [Muslims] recognize and destroy their growing jihadist
cancer they must be held responsible.
—Tweet from Rupert Murdoch, Chairman of Fox News, January
9, 2015

On April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated two bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon.
The Tsarnaev brothers cited the treatment of Muslims by the
U.S. military overseas as motivation for the attacks (Wilson,
Miller, & Horwitz, 2013). However, all the three people who
were killed and over 200 injured from the blast were American
civilians not directly involved in U.S. military interventions
overseas. Since the Boston Marathon bombings, a handful of
other attacks by Muslims on Americans have been launched,
also targeting civilians. On the other side, each terror attack
committed by Muslims has been followed by rhetoric (like the
tweet above) explicitly blaming all Muslims for any attack,
and a multifold increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes committed by non-Muslim Americans against Muslim Americans
(Ingraham, 2015). The pattern of attack and reprisal against
innocents from each group reveals a particular psychological
calculus of intergroup conflict: People have a tendency to hold
groups collectively responsible for the actions of individual

group members, which justifies “vicarious retribution” against
any group member to exact revenge (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom,
Denson, & Schmader, 2006).
Previous research has demonstrated the relevance of collective blame in organizational settings, showing that companies, schools, and even loosely affiliated groups of people are
held responsible for the harmful actions of individual group
members (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Manchi
Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2008; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong,
1999; Singh et al., 2012; Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006).
Much of this research has focused on identifying differences
in the tendency to engage in collective blame in Eastern versus Western cultures (e.g., Chiu et al., 2000; Manchi Chao
et al., 2008), on discerning the psychological precursors of
collective blame, including perceived outgroup homogeneity
and entitativity (e.g., Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, &
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Ames, 2006; Lickel et al., 2006), and on examining the consequences of collective blame—namely, exacting revenge on
people from an offending group who were uninvolved of the
offense (i.e., “vicarious retribution”; Lickel et al., 2006;
Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). However, this
previous work has given less consideration to collective
blame in intergroup contexts, despite its clear potential to
contribute importantly to intergroup hostility.
In a first study, we sought to examine the proclivity for
and correlates of collective blame within the realm of intergroup relations. Specifically, we assessed the degree to
which individuals collectively blamed Muslims for acts of
mass violence committed by small groups of Muslims and
tested the extent to which variability in collective blame predicted anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (prejudice and dehumanization), support for antagonistic policies toward
Muslims, and hostile behavior toward Muslims. Having
identified the importance of collective blame, in the remaining studies we focused our efforts on understanding how it
might be reduced. Our initial approach was to gather a range
of potential intervention strategies and test them against each
other in an “intervention tournament.”

Intervention Tournament
Consistent with the tenets of “action research” (Lewin,
1946), we sought to determine not only “what works” to
reduce collective blame of Muslims, but also “what works
best.” We therefore focused our efforts not on a single intervention, but instead evaluated the efficacy of a number of
interventions simultaneously in an “intervention tournament” (for similar approaches, see J-PAL Policy Bulletin,
2012; Lai et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2016). The interventions in
the current study were videos created by nonscientists that
tapped into at least one identifiable psychological process.
Each of the videos was chosen because it spanned different
styles of delivery (didactic, narrative, satire) and had, in our
estimation, theoretically distinct psychological content. This
allowed us to map specific psychological theories onto each
of the videos (albeit more tightly in some cases than others).
We hypothesized that each of the videos could reduce collective blame, either directly or indirectly, and reasoned that
once we had identified a successful intervention (or set of
interventions), we could then more deliberately explore the
mechanism underlying it (or them).

Overview of Research
In Study 1, we sought to establish the importance of collective blame to an important contemporary intergroup conflict
by showing that the degree to which Americans collectively
blame Muslims for acts of terrorism is associated with antiMuslim attitudes, policy support, and behavior.
In Study 2a and Supplemental Study 1, we examined the
efficacy of interventions aimed at reducing anti-Muslim

attitudes and behaviors. In a “forecasting tournament”
(Supplemental Study 1), we had one group of participants
predict the effect of each intervention on collective blame. In
an “intervention tournament” (Study 2a), we used a second
group of participants to determine the actual effect of each
video on collective blame (then compared the actual effects
with the forecasted effects, in supplemental analyses). After
identifying a “winning” approach in the intervention tournament, we replicated the effects in an independent sample
(Study 2b).
Because we had less control over the specific content of
the intervention videos, we could only speculate about the
processes by which any given video may have been effective. One of the videos that emerged as most effective in the
intervention tournament highlighted, among other things, the
hypocrisy in collectively blaming Muslims but not other
groups (e.g., Christians) for the actions of a few group members. This approach resembles the classic cognitive dissonance hypocrisy paradigm (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991),
in which hypocrisy is induced by the combination of two
factors: (a) Having individuals advocate for a position, and
then (b) making them aware of failure to act in accord with
that position. One way to resolve the resulting cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) is to change one’s behavior to act
in accord with the advocated position. We theorized that the
video in the intervention tournament worked because highlighting hypocrisy in collective blame induced dissonance,
which could be resolved by reducing collective blame of
Muslims. To verify this, we developed in Studies 3a and 3b a
novel interactive activity that was specifically designed to
target the proposed psychological mechanism through a
Socratic exercise. We tested the effectiveness of this activity
relative to two other theoretically distinct and intuitively
promising activities (Study 3a) and replicated the effects of
the activity in a second study (Study 3b).
Thus, this research took a full-cycle approach by (a) identifying collective blame as an important psychological process associated with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior
using correlational data, (b) seeking a successful intervention
to causally mitigate collective blame, and then (c) testing the
mechanism for the successful intervention by developing a
new targeted intervention focused on the proposed key
“ingredient.”

Study 1
In Study 1, we sought to determine the prevalence and correlates of collective blame in an intergroup context by examining non-Muslim Americans’ collective blame of Muslims
for terror attacks. In a cross-sectional study, non-Muslim
American participants reported how much they blamed
Muslims for the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015
that killed 130 people and injured hundreds more. We then
examined the association between collective blame and hostile attitudes, beliefs, and behavior toward Muslims.
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We reasoned that holding all Muslims responsible for a
terror attack would be associated with endorsement of antiMuslim attitudes and beliefs. We focused on anti-Muslim
prejudice and blatant dehumanization of Muslims. We also
reasoned that collective blame of Muslims would be associated with more downstream support for anti-Muslim policies
and anti-Muslim behavior (e.g., willingness to sign antiMuslim petitions).

Method
For this study and all following studies, we determined our
sample size a priori, did not exclude any data from analyses,
and included in our analyses all manipulations and measures,
except where explicitly specified.
Participants. For this correlational study with a range of variables, we aimed to collect a relatively large sample of 200 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Of the 200
non-Muslim Americans who completed the survey, seven
failed an attention check question embedded in the survey,
leaving 193 participants (104 female, Mage = 35.69, SD =
11.38). The final sample was 49.7% Christian, 2.6% Jewish,
2.1% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, 33.2% atheist/agnostic, and 3.6%
“Other,” with 8.3% of participants providing no response. Ethnically, the sample was 80.3% White, 6.2% Asian, 4.7% Hispanic, 6.7% Black, 0.5% Native American, and 1.6% “Other.”
Procedure and stimuli. Participants completed a survey that
assessed the key measure of collective blame, measures of
anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (i.e., blatant dehumanization and prejudice), support for anti-Muslim policies, and
two anti-Muslim behavioral measures.
Collective Blame was assessed by presenting participants
with a brief description of the Paris terror attacks (“In
November 2015, terror attacks in Paris killed 130 people and
wounded hundreds. How responsible do you think Muslims
are for the attacks in Paris?”) and then having them report
how responsible they felt “Muslims in general” and “French
Muslims” were for the attacks using unmarked sliders
anchored at 0 (not at all) and 100 (very much). Note that this
study occurred in the weeks after the attacks, when media
coverage of them was ubiquitous.
Blatant Dehumanization was assessed by asking participants how well a series of eight dehumanizing traits/trait
pairs (e.g., “savage,” “unsophisticated,” “barbaric, coldhearted”; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz,
& Cotterill, 2015) applied to Muslims (α = .95).
Prejudice was assessed by standardizing and combining
responses to two different prejudice measures: feeling thermometers (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and a multiitem measure of Islamoprejudice (Imhoff & Recker, 2012).
With the feeling thermometers, participants reported their
affective prejudice toward a range of groups—including
Americans and Muslims—on unmarked sliders anchored at
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0 (very cold/unfavorable) and 100 (very warm/favorable).
We took as our measure of anti-Muslim prejudice the difference in response to Americans versus Muslims.
Islamoprejudice was assessed using a 15-item scale developed by Imhoff and Recker (2012). The 15-item scale
includes nine items (e.g., “Islam is an archaic religion,
unable to adjust to the present”) that reflect Islamoprejudice
and have previously been associated with anti-Muslim
intentions. These are differentiated from six further items
intended to reflect a secular critique of Islam that have been
shown to be unassociated with anti-Muslim intentions
(Imhoff & Recker, 2012) and which we therefore excluded
from analyses. Responses were made on unmarked sliders
anchored at 0 (completely disagree) and 100 (completely
agree). A factor analysis revealed that one of the
Islamoprejudice items loaded more strongly with the Secular
Concern items; we therefore created an Islamoprejudice
scale with the remaining eight items (α = .83). To create a
single measure of prejudice, feeling thermometer and
Islamoprejudice were each z scored and then combined (r =
.66, p < .001).
Anti-Muslim Policy Support was assessed by asking participants to indicate their support for nine policies targeting
Muslims taken from Kteily and Bruneau (2017); sample
items included “We should ban the wearing of the Islamic
veil” and “We should ban the opening of any new Mosques in
this country.” Responses were made on 7-point Likert-type
scales anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly
agree). Several of the policies were adapted directly from
campaign statements of (then Presidential candidate) Donald
Trump (α = .95).
Punitive Counterterrorism (behavior) was assessed
using a measure adapted from Kteily et al. (2015) in which
participants were asked to allocate funds in any proportion
to two antiterrorism programs: “Build libraries and schools
in Muslim-majority communities throughout the United
States” (i.e., “preventative counter-terrorism”) and
“Increase surveillance and policing capabilities in Muslimmajority communities throughout the United States” (i.e.,
“punitive counter-terrorism”). We took the proportion of
funds distributed to punitive counterterrorism as the
outcome measure.
Signing Anti-Muslim Petitions (behavior) was assessed
by giving participants the opportunity to sign six petitions
urging congressional members to implement anti-Muslim
policies (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Kteily et al., 2015). Three
of the petitions focused on Muslim refugees (sample item:
“Urge congressional members to deny entry to any Muslim
refugees who seek to come to the United States”); the other
three petitions were associated with Muslims more generally
(sample item: “Urge congressional members to introduce
surveillance programs targeting Mosques in the United
States”). Responses were coded as +1 for signatures in support of anti-Muslim petitions, –1 for signatures to the counterpetitions, and 0 for no signature (α = .93).

433

Bruneau et al.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Intercorrelations in Study 1.

1. Collective blame
2. Blatant dehumanization
3. Prejudice
4. Punitive counterterror
5. Anti-Muslim policies
6. Anti-Muslim petitions
M
SD

1

2

—
.71***
.73**
.72***
.68***
.56***
35.65a
34.84

—
.78***
.72***
.63***
.54***
3.66b
1.52

3

—
.84***
.81***
.60***
0.00c
1.00

4

5

6

—
.85***
.68***
38.12a
37.63

—
.58***
2.86b
1.77

—
−0.08d
0.53

a

Scale: 0 to 100.
Scale: 1 to 7.
c
Scale: z score.
d
Scale: –1, 0, +1.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
b

Results
The primary goals of Study 1 were to examine the degree to
which Muslims are held collectively responsible for an individual terror attack, and the correlates of collective blame.
The mean response on the 100-point scale was 35.65 (SD =
34.84) for the terror attacks in Paris in 2015. Confirming our
predictions, we found that the tendency to hold Muslims
collectively responsible was significantly correlated with
each of the other measures (Table 1). Thus, those who collectively blamed Muslims were also more likely to feel prejudiced against Muslims, dehumanize them, support
anti-Muslim policies, donate to surveillance over education
in Muslim communities to prevent terrorism, and sign petitions targeting Muslims. We observed a similar pattern of
results when we examined participants’ tendency to collectively blame French Muslims (rather than “Muslims in
general”).

Study 2a
Study 1 confirmed that the degree to which Americans collectively blame Muslims for acts of terrorism is associated
with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior. This study thus
verifies that collective blame is relevant in the intergroup
domain and holds the potential to importantly influence
downstream policy attitudes and behavior. In Study 2a, we
shifted our attention to determining how collective blame
can be reduced by determining the efficacy of eight different
video interventions.
We conducted two separate studies using the videos. In
the main experiment (Study 2a), participants reported collective blame, other anti-Muslim attitudes (blatant dehumanization, prejudice, Islamoprejudice), and outcomes
associated with vicarious retribution as part of an “intervention tournament.” As a secondary aim, we had a separate sample of participants (Supplementary Study 1) report
their lay predictions of each video’s effectiveness using a

“forecasting tournament,” in which participants predicted
how much other non-Muslim Americans would collectively
blame Muslims for individual acts of terrorism after watching each video.
The forecasting tournament was included to control for
potential experimenter bias (i.e., consciously or unconsciously pitting a “favored” video against a set of weak, lowquality, or inferior alternatives) but mostly to extend insights
about individuals’ (lack of) ability to forecast the success of
interventions (e.g., Cialdini, 2003; Noar, 2006) to the realm
of intergroup relations. It is possible that the prevalence of
intergroup hostility provides individuals with good lay intuitions about its underlying causes (and how to reduce hostility). However, it is also possible that individuals are poor at
identifying effective approaches for improving intergroup
relations because these interventions may be operating in
ways that are not easily accessible to lay perceivers (e.g.,
through unconscious processes). Addressing this question is
theoretically important because it extends the generalizability of prior demonstrations of poor forecasting to intergroup
processes, and practically important because finding that
individuals are poor judges of what works when it comes to
reducing hostility would have major implications for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and others who develop
interventions based on intuition or focus groups, but do not
test for their effects.
For the tournaments, we chose eight 2- to 4-min videos
that included psychological elements that could directly or
indirectly reduce collective blame. In one video (Video 1), a
Muslim woman revealed the hypocrisy of blaming Muslims
as a group for Muslim extremists, but not blaming Christians
as a group for Christian extremists. This approach is loosely
aligned with a hypocrisy paradigm that has been successfully
employed to generate cognitive dissonance and induce prosocial behaviors (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller,
1992; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). We
therefore thought it plausible that the induction or revelation
of the hypocrisy of collectively blaming some groups but not
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others could reduce collective blame of Muslims. Five videos
(Videos 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) targeted collective blame indirectly
by challenging the homogeneity and/or entitativity of
Muslims. As group homogeneity and entitativity serve as
direct precursors to collective blame (Denson et al., 2006;
Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003), reducing these perceptions could plausibly erode collective blame. Video 2 challenged the perception of Muslim homogeneity by presenting
the diversity of the Muslim experience as part of an engaging
TED Talk, and Videos 1, 5, and 6 challenged Muslim homogeneity by providing counterstereotypical exemplars, such as
an assertive (vs. submissive) Muslim woman (Videos 1 and
6), or a soft-spoken Muslim cleric talking about his love for,
and deference to, his wife (Video 5). Another video challenged perceived homogeneity of Muslims directly with
didactic arguments during a confrontational television news
interview (Video 3).
Many of the videos also included elements that we
hypothesized would reduce anti-Muslim attitudes in general,
but which could also affect collective blame specifically. For
example, three of the videos (Videos 1, 5, and 6) gave participants the opportunity to hear directly from Muslims about
their own experiences, allowing perspective-taking, which
has been shown in many studies to improve intergroup attitudes and foster prosocial behavior (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012;
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). As the perspectives often
illustrated nuanced views and challenged stereotypes, the
shared perspectives could also reduce collective blame indirectly by reducing perceived homogeneity.
Another video (Video 7) provided normative examples of
Americans espousing and engaging in pro-Muslim behaviors: A White mother helping her child donate to a vandalized mosque, and an interview with a man who attended a
2nd amendment rally across the street from a mosque wearing a “Fuck Islam” T-shirt who spoke of the transformation
he experienced after accepting an invitation from the imam
of the mosque to observe a service. Social proof has been
shown previously to strongly influence behavior (McDonald
& Crandall, 2015), and we thought it plausible that seeing
others engage in pro-Muslim behaviors might influence participants’ views of Muslims. The videos could specifically
reduce collective blame through social proof—showing people who do not hold Muslims collectively responsible (even
if they once did).
Two videos (Videos 4 and 6) challenged common beliefs
about Muslims (that they hate America/Americans, and that
Muslim immigrants would strain the economy) by citing
data countering these views. Notably, in providing data
from Pew surveys showing that people in the Muslim world
generally respect and appreciate America/Americans,
Video 6 challenged negative meta-perceptions—a technique
that has been shown to reduce reciprocal hostility (Kteily,
Hodson, & Bruneau, 2016). Finally, six videos (Videos 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, and 8) challenged the stereotype that Islam is a
uniquely violent religion. For example, in Video 8, a

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 44(3)
documentarian read to people on the street passages from
the “Quran” that condone violence, only to reveal that it
was actually an Old Testament wrapped in a Quran book
cover. Challenging the view that Muslim religious teachings are uniquely violent may indirectly reduce the perception that Muslims are intrinsically supportive of violence,
which could reduce the tendency to blame all Muslims for
the violent actions of individual group members.
It is worth noting that the psychological mechanisms
listed above are speculative—reflecting what we theorized
were the main psychological “ingredients” of each video—
and not necessarily exhaustive. Moreover, individual videos
sometimes included elements potentially operating via multiple psychological mechanisms, and the style of a given
video or its protagonist could enhance or detract from the
efficacy of any given intervention. Therefore, we suggest
that this type of intervention tournament should not be used
as evidence against the utility of any particular theoretical
approach to reduce collective blame. Rather, we viewed this
method as a first step to identify promising approaches, ruling in a subset of potentially relevant psychological factors
that could then be subjected to further analysis and targeted
verification. We take this approach here.
We randomly assigned non-Muslim American participants to view one of the intervention videos, an “empty” control condition (in which participants saw no-video), or a
“negative control” condition. For the “negative control,” participants watched a video in which a Muslim woman provided “criticism from within,” suggesting that Islam is
inherently violent, and that there is a clash between Muslim
cultures and the West. We hypothesized that this video would
increase collective blame of Muslims and hostility toward
them, by framing them as an inherently violent group dedicated to aggressing against Western targets. Notably, evidence showing that decreasing collective blame improves
attitudes toward Muslims or evidence showing that increasing collective blame worsens attitudes would support our
theoretical suggestion that collective blame can cause antiMuslim sentiments (although the former would, of course,
be more useful for the practical purpose of promoting intergroup harmony). We also note that the arguments presented
in the “negative control” are conceptually similar to many
arguments presented on mainstream U.S. media in the aftermath of violent attacks by Muslims in the United States,
making the inclusion of the “negative” control video both a
theoretically informative and practically relevant point of
comparison against which to assess the interventions. For
links to each video and a summary of the information they
contain, see Table 2.

Participants
We performed a power analysis using G*Power 3.1, and found
that obtaining a small effect size (d = .30), with an alpha of .05
and power of .95 would require at least 135 participants per
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Table 2. Summaries and Potential Psychological Mechanisms for the Videos Used for the Intervention Tournament (Study 2a) and
Forecasting Tournament (Supplemental Study 1).
Link and summary of condition video

Potential psychological mechanisms

Negative Control: Muslims Responsible
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133535
Interview with a Syrian-born woman who attacks Islam and Muslims as backward,
primitive, violent, and at odds with Western civilization.
Video 1: Collective Blame Hypocrisy
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199836
Al Jazeera interview with Linda Sarsour, a Muslim American woman who discusses
the tendency to blame all Muslims for terror attacks, but not blame Christians
for extremism by individual Christians.
Video 2: Homogeneity 1
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133534
TED talk by a Muslim American man describing (and showing) his photojournalistic journey through diverse Muslim communities around the world.
Video 3: Homogeneity 2
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199837
CNN interview with Reza Aslan, a Muslim American scholar who challenges the
view (expressed by the hosts) that policies in one Muslim-majority country
should characterize “Muslims” or “Islam.”
Video 4: Counterstereotyping 1
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133531
A segment from the satirical news program, The Daily Show, in which host John
Oliver calls out media bias in their negative coverage of Muslims and Muslim
violence.
Video 5: Counterstereotyping 2
https://player.vimeo.com/video/158199845
A short video that witnesses an Egyptian imam and his wife describing their loving
and respectful relationship to a small group of Muslims.
Video 6: Challenge Meta-Perceptions
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133532
MSNBC interview with Dalia Mogahed, a Muslim American researcher who
presents data from Pew surveys illustrating that Muslims view Americans and
America favorably.
Video 7: Normative Prosocial
https://player.vimeo.com/video/160259623
Two news clips: A White conservative who describes his change of heart after
visiting a mosque he was protesting across from; a White boy and his mother
interviewed after donating money to a vandalized mosque.
Video 8: Counterstereotyping 3
https://player.vimeo.com/video/159133527
“Gotcha” interviews where people respond to “Quran” passages that are
primitive and intolerant by modern social norms, and then revealing that the
passages were actually from a Bible in a Quran book cover.

[Increased] homogeneity;
stereotyping

3:12

Cognitive dissonance; perspectivetaking; counterstereotyping;
decrease homogeneity

2:07

Decrease homogeneity; decrease
entitativity; counterstereotyping

4:24

Decrease homogeneity; decrease
entitativity; counterstereotyping;
cognitive dissonance

4:04

Counterstereotyping; humanization;
collective guilt

3:52

Counterstereotyping; decrease
homogeneity; decrease
entitativity; perspective-taking

2:41

Improve meta-perceptions;
perspective-taking; decrease
homogeneity; decrease entitativity

3:35

Social proof (prosocial norms)

3:23

Counterstereotyping; cognitive
dissonance

3:16

condition. To allow for the loss of data from people who failed
an embedded attention check, we recruited 180 participants
for each of the 10 conditions in the study. Thirty-five participants failed the check question, leaving 1,765 participants in
the final analyses (49.8% female, Mage = 34.75, SD = 11.3).
The final sample was 46.2% Christian, 1.7% Jewish, 1.7%
Buddhist, 0.7% Hindu, 43.8% atheist/agnostic, and 5.8%
“Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.8% White, 6.0% Asian,
5.8% Hispanic, 7.0% Black, 0.6% Native American, 0.2%
Arab, 2.1% biracial, and 0.5% “Other.”1

Length

Procedure and Stimuli
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of the eight
videos, the negative control video, or the no-video control
condition. After viewing one of the videos (or not, in the novideo control condition), participants completed a survey,
which included the key measure of collective blame, two measures assessing attitudes and beliefs about Muslims (dehumanization, prejudice) and two outcome measures (anti-Muslim
policy support and support for punitive counterterrorism).
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Table 3. Study 2a: Means (SD) and ANOVAs for Each Measure.
Collective blame

Blatant
dehumanization

Prejudice

Punitive
counterterrorism

Anti-Muslim
policies

Scale
Muslims responsible
(N = 177)

0-100
40.08a
(35.75)

100-+100
15.48a
(27.12)

z score
.378a
(1.08)

0-100
65.15
(37.34)

1-7
3.13
(1.78)

No-video control
(N = 174)

29.78
(34.18)

8.56
(25.18)

.068
(1.06)

67.14
(34.69)

2.95
(1.66)

Collective blame Hypocrisy
(N = 176)
Homogeneity 1
(N = 178)
Homogeneity 2
(N = 171)
Counterstereotyping 1
(N = 177)
Counterstereotyping 2
(N = 179)
Challenge metaperceptions
(N = 175)
Normative prosocial
(N = 175)
Counterstereotyping 3
(N = 181)
ANOVA
F(9, 1764)

20.66a
(28.53)
30.87
(33.27)
27.99
(32.46)
27.97
(33.29)
30.46
(34.77)
23.40b
(31.07)

5.90
(21.96)
5.26
(18.57)
5.29
(22.59)
6.85
(20.15)
8.84
(25.54)
9.31
(21.52)

−.136b
(0.91)
−.053
(0.88)
−.062
(0.93)
−.022
(1.00)
.081
(1.04)
−.086
(1.06)

69.63
(33.56)
65.82
(36.53)
68.40
(34.42)
68.89
(36.76)
66.17
(36.31)
69.59
(35.61)

2.71
(1.61)
2.90
(1.72)
2.87
(1.63)
2.81
(1.65)
2.94
(1.74)
2.85
(1.74)

23.12b
(31.18)
29.63
(33.48)
4.72***
η2 = .024

5.85
(21.55)
8.96
(22.96)
3.19**
η2 = .016

−.112
(1.01)
−.069
(0.93)
4.13**
η2 = .021

68.27
(35.29)
65.30
(36.25)
.42

2.80
(1.68)
2.97
(1.66)
.83

Condition

a

(and bold) Means that are significantly different from no-video controls (p < .05).
Means that are marginally different from no-video controls (p < .10).

b

Collective Blame was assessed as in Study 1, but with
respect to the Brussels Airport terror attack, which had occurred
weeks prior to the study (“How responsible do you think
Muslims in general are for the attacks at the Brussels Airport?”).
Dehumanization was assessed using the Ascent
Dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015), which presents
participants with the popular “Ascent of Man” diagram and
asks them to determine where target groups fall on the scale,
from the quadrupedal early human ancestor (0) to fully
“evolved” modern human (100). We took as our measure of
dehumanization the difference in reported “evolvedness”
between Americans and Muslims.
Prejudice was assessed as in Study 1, by standardizing
and averaging the Islamoprejudice composite (α = .89) and
feeling thermometer ratings; r = .74, p < .001. Anti-Muslim
Policy Support (α = .92) and Punitive Counterterrorism were
also assessed as in Study 1.2

Results
Interventions tournament. For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for the control condition, see Table S1.
Mean results for each condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are
presented in Table 3.

In the intervention tournament, participants were
assigned to view one of the videos (or not, in the no-video
control condition) and were then asked to report their collective blame of Muslims. We found a significant effect of condition on collective blame, F(9, 1719) = 4.72, p < .001, η2 =
.024. We then conducted a series of planned t tests to examine the differences in collective blame between those in the
control condition and those who watched each of the videos.
Only Video 1 (“Collective Blame Hypocrisy”) significantly
reduced collective blame (M = 20.66, SD = 28.53) relative
to the no-video control condition, t(343) = 2.69, p = .008, d
= .29. Collective blame was also significantly lower for
those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition versus
those in four of the remaining seven intervention conditions
(ts > 2.1, ps < .04). Mean collective blame scores were marginally lower among participants who viewed Videos 6
(“Challenge Meta-Perceptions”) and 7 (“Normative
Prosocial”) relative to those in the no-video control condition (ts > 1.8, ps < .075).
On the contrary, participants who viewed the negative
control video (“Muslims Responsible”) reported significantly higher collective blame (M = 40.08, SD = 35.75) versus those in the no-video control condition, M = 29.78, SD =
34.18; t(349) = 2.76, p = .006, d = .30, and versus those in
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each of the other intervention conditions (ts > 2.4, ps < .02).
See Table 3 for means responses to all measures across condition and Figure S1 for a graphical depiction of mean collective blame ratings across all videos.
We also examined mean responses to the two negative attitudes and beliefs (blatant dehumanization, prejudice), and the
two outcome measures (support for punitive counterterrorism, support for anti-Muslim policies). There was a main
effect of condition for the attitudes and beliefs, blatant dehumanization: F(9, 1757) = 3.19, p = .001, η2 = .016; prejudice:
F(9, 1763) = 4.13, p < .001, η2 = .021, but not for the outcome
measures (Fs < 1). We conducted planned t tests on each of
dehumanization and prejudice to see which intervention(s)
drove the effect.
Those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition (Video
1) reported marginally lower levels of prejudice (M = –.136,
SD = 0.91) than no-video controls, M = .068, SD = 1.06;
t(355) = 1.95, p = .052, d = .21. At the same time, negative
controls reported greater prejudice (M = .378, SD = 1.08) than
no-video controls, t(359) = 2.75, p = .006, d = .29, Collective
Blame Hypocrisy, t(354) = 4.87, p < .001, d = .52, and all
other conditions (ts > 2.6, ps < .008).
The main effect of dehumanization was driven primarily
by the negative control: Those in the negative control dehumanized Muslims more (M = 15.48, SD = 27.12), compared
with the no-video controls, M = 8.56, SD = 25.18; t(357) =
2.51, p = .013, d = .27, and compared with those in the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition, M = 5.90, SD =
21.96; t(351) = 3.64, p < .001, d = .39. Dehumanization
reported by those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition was lower than no-video controls, but not significantly
so, t(354) = 1.06, p = .289.
We conceptualized collective blame as a belief that
could shape anti-Muslim policy support and behavior both
directly and also indirectly by increasing negative attitudes
and beliefs about Muslims (i.e., prejudice, dehumanization). In particular, to the extent that individuals collectively blame all Muslims for mass violence committed by a
few, people could come to feel more dislike toward Muslims
and see the group in more dehumanized terms (e.g., as
“savages”). Given that prejudice and dehumanization are
both known to (independently) predict hostile outcomes
(e.g., Kteily et al., 2015), any effect of collective blame on
these constructs could have downstream consequences on
their anti-Muslim policy support. Focusing on the effects of
the most effective video (i.e., Collective Blame Hypocrisy—
Video 1), we used sequential mediation models (PROCESS,
Hayes, 2012; Model 6) for each outcome measure to test
the effect of condition (collective blame hypocrisy vs. control) on anti-Muslim policies, with collective blame as a
first mediator and prejudice or dehumanization as subsequent mediators (to isolate their unique effects, we controlled for dehumanization when examining prejudice and
vice versa). Specifically, we examined the indirect effects
of the intervention on the outcome measures via collective

blame. These included the indirect effect of the intervention
from collective blame directly to the outcome measures
(i.e., independent of prejudice and dehumanization), as
well as the sequential indirect effects from the intervention
to the outcomes through collective blame and then each of
prejudice and dehumanization.
We found that collective blame (CB) directly mediated the
effect of condition on both distal outcome measures (condition
 CB  anti-Muslim policies and punitive counterterrorism).
There were also significant indirect effects from condition to
the outcome measures via collective blame’s link to prejudice
(condition  CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim policies and
behavior). Notably, the indirect effect of condition on outcomes through prejudice alone (condition  prejudice 
anti-Muslim policies) was not significant. The indirect effect
from condition to the outcomes via collective blame’s link to
dehumanization (condition  CB  dehumanization  antiMuslim policies) was not significant, nor was the indirect
effect of condition on outcomes through dehumanization
alone (condition  dehumanization  anti-Muslim policies).
See Figures S2 and Table S2.3
Forecasting Tournament. To test the potential discrepancy
between lay perceptions of our interventions’ effectiveness
and their actual effectiveness, we assigned a separate group
of Americans (N = 938) to view a video and predict its effect
on collective blame (see Supplemental Study 1).
In this forecasting tournament, participants reported their
predictions about how the video they were randomly assigned
to watch would affect Americans’ collective blame of
Muslims relative to control levels of collective blame:
When asked how responsible they think Muslims in general are
for the Paris attacks in 2015, American mTurkers report an
average response of 30 on a 100-point scale, where 0 = not at all
responsible and 100 = completely responsible. After watching
this video, how much do you think American mTurkers will
hold Muslims responsible for the Paris attacks?

Participants were then provided a slider anchored at 0 (not at
all responsible) and 100 (completely responsible), with the
slider starting point set at 30 on the scale (i.e., the mean
response for control participants in the interventions
tournament).
Interestingly, the actual effect of the collective blame
hypocrisy video on collective blame was significantly greater
than the effect predicted by forecasters, t(272) = 2.44, p =
.015, d = .30. See Supplementary Study 1 for details and
Figure S3 and Table S3 for a summary of results.

Discussion
Overall, the intervention tournament revealed a strategy
(Collective Blame Hypocrisy) that significantly reduced collective blame and marginally reduced prejudice. Although
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this intervention did not have direct effects on anti-Muslim
policies (i.e., distal outcome measures), we did find evidence
of significant indirect effects of the intervention on outcomes
via its reduction of collective blame.
Two other approaches resulted in marginally significant
reductions in collective blame: An interview with a Muslim
woman who was friendly, intellectual, and assertive (i.e.,
counterstereotypical), and who presented evidence from Pew
surveys challenging negative meta-perceptions among
Americans with respect to Muslims (Video 6—“Challenge
Meta-Perceptions”). This is consistent with previous
research, which demonstrated a reduction in anti-Muslim
attitudes among participants who were provided with a purportedly real newspaper article that included information
from these same surveys suggesting that Muslims saw
Americans in a humanizing light (Kteily et al., 2016). A second intervention that resulted in marginally lower collective
blame was a video that presented two examples of White
Americans engaging in prosocial gestures toward Muslims
(Video 7—“Normative Prosocial”). These effects are consistent with research on the impact of social norms on prejudice
(e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Although we
decided to continue here by focusing on the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy intervention because it had the numerically largest effects, future research could explore the potential for
normative intergroup interventions to shift intergroup attitudes and behavior.
It is also noteworthy that the remaining five interventions
failed to significantly reduce collective blame (or other antiMuslim sentiments). That said, because we “crowdsourced”
the videos, rather than developing them ourselves to test specific theories, they often contained multiple potential psychological elements. These elements were also packaged in
ways that could have enhanced or detracted from their efficacy. These results should therefore not be used as evidence
against specific psychological theories. Instead, taking a
rule-in (vs. rule-out) approach, we zoomed in on the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy video, which, among other
things, highlighted individuals’ hypocrisy in collectively
blaming some groups but not others for the actions of a few.
We focused on replicating the effects of this video (Study 2b)
and then verifying our theoretical supposition that highlighting hypocrisy was central to its effects (Studies 3a and 3b).

Study 2b
Study 2a established that revealing the hypocrisy of collectively blaming Muslims but not White people/Christians for
individual acts of violence significantly decreased collective
blame of Muslims and marginally reduced prejudice; it also
revealed that a video framing Muslims as collectively
responsible for violence (i.e., Negative control—“Muslims
Responsible”) increased collective blame, prejudice, and
dehumanization. However, the number of conditions (and
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thus comparisons) increases the probability that our results
reflected a false positive. In Study 2b, we therefore sought to
replicate the results of Study 2a, focusing on the critical conditions: Video 1—Collective Blame Hypocrisy, Negative
Control—Muslims Responsible, and no-video control.
Participants. To obtain similar sample sizes for each of the
three conditions as were obtained in Study 2a, we recruited
600 participants on Mechanical Turk. Three people did not
finish the survey, and 15 people failed the check question,
leaving 582 participants (329 female, Mage = 34.69, SD =
11.70). The final sample was 52.9% Christian, 1.9% Jewish,
1.9% Buddhist, 0.2% Hindu, 37.1% atheist/agnostic, and
6.0% “Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.3% White,
5.2% Asian, 6.4% Hispanic, 7.7% Black, 0.7% Native
American, 0.2% Arab, 1.9% biracial, and 0.7% “Other.”
Procedures and Stimuli. The procedure was identical to Study
2a, except that participants were randomly assigned to one of
only three conditions: Video 1—Collective Blame Hypocrisy, Negative Control—Muslims Responsible, or no-video
control.
Collective blame was assessed as in Study 1.
Blatant Dehumanization was assessed with the multi-item
trait measure from Study 1 (α = .95) and the single-item
Ascent dehumanization measure from Study 2a. We combined the measures to form a single scale by standardizing
each and averaging them together (see, for example, Kteily
& Bruneau, 2017).
Prejudice was assessed as in Studies 1 and 2a, by averaging the z scored feeling thermometer and Islamoprejudice (α
= .88) ratings, r = .66, p < .001, as was Anti-Muslim Policy
Support (α = .91).4

Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for
the control condition, see Table S4. Mean results for each
condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are presented in Table 4.
As predicted, a univariate ANOVA performed on collective
blame revealed a main effect of condition, F(2, 578) = 19.0, p <
.001, η2 = .062. Follow-up independent-samples t tests replicated the results of Study 2a: Collective blame was approximately 10 points higher for those in the Muslims Responsible
condition (M = 40.50, SD = 34.90) versus no-video controls, M
= 29.89, SD = 33.03; t(390) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .31, and
approximately 10 points lower for those in the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy condition (M = 20.47, SD = 26.57) versus no-video
controls, t(386) = 3.09, p = .002, d = .31; Table 4, Figure S4.
Demonstrating a similar pattern as Study 2a, but with
stronger effects, ANOVAs for anti-Muslim attitudes and
beliefs (prejudice, blatant dehumanization) were also significant (Fs > 9.9, ps < .001, η2 > .030). Follow-up planned
t tests showed that dehumanization was significantly higher
for those in the Muslims Responsible condition (M = .24,
SD = 1.02) than the no-video controls, M = –.030,
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Table 4. Study 2b Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t Tests Across Conditions.
Collective
blame

Blatant
dehumanization

Prejudice

Anti-Muslim
policies

Scale
Muslims responsible
(N = 193)

0-100
40.50
(34.90)

z score
.237
(1.02)

z score
.241
(1.03)

1-7
3.26
(1.85)

No-video controls
(N = 199)

29.89
(33.03)

−.030
(1.01)

.00
(1.00)

3.05
(1.71)

20.47
(26.57)
19.0***
η2 = .062
3.09***
(d = .31)
3.09***
(d = .31)
6.30***
(d = .65)

−.210
(0.92)
9.97***
η2 = .033
1.84†
(d = .19)
2.59*
(d = .26)
4.50***
(d = .46)

−.244
(0.90)
11.67***
η2 = .039
2.50*
(d = .26)
2.36*
(d = .24)
4.89***
(d = .50)

Condition
Means (SD)

Independent t tests: t
value (Cohen’s d)

Collective blame hypocrisy
(N = 190)
ANOVA
F(2, 578)
Control vs. hypocrisy
t(387)
Muslims resp vs. control
t(390)
Muslims resp vs. hypocrisy
t(381)

2.78
(1.67)
3.59*
η2 = .012
1.57
1.16
2.64***
(d = .27)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

SD = 1.01; t(390) = 2.59, p = .010, d = .26; dehumanization
was marginally lower for those in the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy condition (M = –.21, SD = 0.92) than the novideo controls, t(387) = 1.84, p = .067. Results for prejudice were very similar: Prejudice among those in the
Muslims Responsible condition (M = .24, SD = 1.03) was
significantly greater than for those in the no-video controls,
M = .00, SD = 1.00; t(390) = 2.36, p = .019, d = .24, and
prejudice was significantly lower for those in the Collective
Blame Hypocrisy condition (M = –.24, SD = 0.90) than for
no-video controls, t(387) = 2.50, p = .013, d = .26.
There was also a main effect of condition for the outcome
measure, anti-Muslim policy support, F(2, 579) = 3.59, p = .028,
η2 = .012, driven by a significant difference between the Muslims
Responsible video and the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video,
t(381) = 2.64, p = .009, d = .27. The difference between each
video and the no-video control condition did not reach significance (ts < 1.6, ps > .10). See Table 4 for a summary of results.
As with Study 2a, we tested the indirect effects of the intervention (Collective Blame Hypocrisy video vs. no-video control) on anti-Muslim policy support. Consistent with Study 2a,
there was a significant indirect effect from the condition to antiMuslim policies via collective blame (condition  CB  antiMuslim policies). Beyond the role collective blame played
independent of prejudice and dehumanization, we also
observed a significant sequential indirect effect from the intervention condition on anti-Muslim policies through collective
blame’s relationship with prejudice (condition  CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim policies) and (unlike Study 2a) dehumanization
(condition  CB  dehumanization  anti-Muslim
policies). Also consistent with Study 2a, once the indirect
effects via collective blame were taken into account, there were
no significant indirect effects of condition on outcomes through

prejudice or dehumanization (i.e., condition  prejudice/dehumanization  anti-Muslim policy support; all indirect effects
included 0 in the 95% confidence intervals). See Figure S5 and
Table S5. Study 2b therefore replicated the main results from
Study 2a.5

Study 3a
Studies 2a and 2b provided evidence that a 2-min video
interview with a Muslim American woman was sufficient to
change how much people collectively blamed Muslims in
general for individual acts of violence. A portion of the
interview included a comment by the Muslim American
guest that many people blame all Muslims for actions committed by individual Muslims, but do not blame all Christians
for the actions of Christian extremist groups (i.e., the
“Westboro Baptist Church” and the Ku Klux Klan [KKK],
which are characterized as Hate Groups by the Southern
Poverty Law Center; “Extremist Files: Westboro Baptist
Church,” 2016). We hypothesized that this video effectively
reduced collective blame because it helped to reveal to
viewers the (potentially unconscious) hypocrisy of holding
some groups (i.e., Muslims) more responsible for the actions
of individual group members than other groups (i.e., White
Americans, Christians). As holding inconsistent views is
generally aversive (Festinger, 1962), we reasoned that the
specter of hypocrisy was enough to cause people to reduce
their attributions of collective blame so that they could
avoid the inconsistency. However, video stimuli are inherently complex, and it is possible that other aspects of the
video were in fact responsible for the observed effects. If
revealing the hypocritical nature of collective blame was in
fact driving our effects as we assumed, then revealing it in
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other ways (i.e., beyond the specific video used in Studies
2a and 2b) should yield similar effects.
In Study 3a, we therefore sought to specifically test the
effects of revealing the intergroup bias in collective blame
using a different and more controlled method. Rather than
exposing participants to the hypocrisy of collective blame
through a didactic argument, we illuminated the hypocrisy to
participants through a targeted interactive activity that
employed a Socratic approach. In the activity, participants
first reported how much they blamed themselves and White
Americans for acts of mass violence committed by highly
self-identified White men. Next, using the same slider scale,
participants reported how much they blamed individual
Muslims for a terror attack. Finally, they reported how much
they blamed Muslims in general for an act of mass violence
committed by Muslims (i.e., collective blame). We reasoned
that people would be very unlikely to blame themselves or
White Americans for acts of mass violence by ingroup members, and that they would subsequently hold Muslims minimally responsible for acts of terrorism to avoid cognitive
dissonance. In line with the results from Studies 2a and 2b,
we further predicted that the hypothesized reductions in collective blame would mediate reductions in anti-Muslim policy support and anti-Muslim behavior, both directly and by
reducing anti-Muslim attitudes and beliefs (i.e., prejudice
and dehumanization).

Method
Participants and design. We recruited 605 participants from
Mechanical Turk for a five-condition study. Sample sizes
were slightly smaller than obtained in Studies 2a and 2b, but
still large enough to provide 80% power to detect a small to
medium effect size (d = .35). Twelve people failed the attention check question, leaving 593 participants (314 female,
Mage = 35.56, SD = 11.78). The final sample was 79.6%
White, 5.7% Asian, 4.6% Hispanic, 7.4% Black, 1.0% Native
American, 0.5% Middle Eastern, 1.0% biracial, and 0.2%
“Other.” Due to a coding error, religious affiliation was not
collected.
Participants were randomly placed into one of five conditions: A Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity, a no-activity
control condition, or one of three alternative activities
(described below) that were inspired by psychological theory
and represented in arguments that were widely circulated
through social media (in an attempt to reduce anti-Muslim
sentiments) in the wake of terror attacks by Muslim
extremists.
Procedure and stimuli. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity was composed of two parts. First, participants reported
how responsible they held White Americans and themselves
for three different individual acts of violence committed by
White people: Dylann Roof (who killed nine Black parishioners at a church in 2015), Anders Breivik (who killed 77
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Norwegians, mostly children, in 2011), and Wage Page (who
killed six Sikhs at a temple, believing they were Muslims, in
2012). To foreshadow a comparison with violence committed by “Muslim extremists,” we noted that each perpetrator
was motivated by his White identity. For example, “On June
17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, and during a prayer service killed
nine African American parishioners. Roof cited his White
identity as a motivation for the attacks.” Participants then
responded to the following: “How responsible do you think
you are for the acts of Dylann Roof?” and “How responsible
do you think White Americans are for the acts of Dylann
Roof?” Responses to each question were made using
unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (not at all responsible) and
100 (completely responsible). We then asked how responsible participants felt White Americans were for hate crimes
by White supremacists in the United States, and White
supremacists in Europe. We predicted that participants would
attribute very little responsibility to themselves and White
Americans for the specific actions of mass violence, and for
hate crimes committed by White supremacist groups.
Next, we asked participants to report, using the same
scales, how responsible they felt individual Muslims were
for an act of violence committed by Muslim extremists (e.g.,
“Ahmad works as a bank teller in Jordan. How responsible
do you think Ahmad is for the Brussels Airport attacks?”).
Finally, we asked how responsible they thought Muslims
were, in general, for the Paris terror attacks. Overall, we
hypothesized that reporting low levels of collective blame
for oneself and White Americans would precipitate lower
levels of collective blame of Muslims, in general, for terror
attacks, which would have downstream effects on anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support.
Similar to Study 2a, we examined the impact of the
Hypocrisy activity relative to other popular approaches that
mapped broadly onto psychological theories suggesting their
plausibility in reducing collective blame. The first (“Ingroup
Guilt”) exposed participants to historical opinion polling
prior to and during World War II showing that Americans
were opposed to accepting Jewish refugees. We hypothesized that this could elicit collective ingroup guilt for
American rejection of Jews during the Holocaust—a moral
emotion that has been shown to facilitate support for reparations (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008;
Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011;
Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). We reasoned that
individuals who were exposed to this information might
soften their attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim refugees
to assuage their guilt. This strategy was used widely in social
media to evoke sympathy for Muslim refugees, and was
reported on by major news outlets (e.g., The Washington
Post; Tharoor, 2015). A second version of the intervention
additionally presented photos directly drawing the link
between interned Jewish children and interned Muslim refugee children, and provided a statement by the Holocaust
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Memorial admonishing governments for their refusal to
accept Muslim refugees. Because this version had an additional component that, at least in theory, strengthened the
basis for feeling guilt, we labeled this intervention “Ingroup
Guilt+.” Although we thought it plausible that these two
interventions (Ingroup Guilt and Ingroup Guilt+) could also
reduce collective blame of Muslims, we thought it most
likely that this intervention would change policy support and
behaviors toward Muslims via reducing prejudice.
The final intervention was designed to challenge stereotypes about Muslim aggression by highlighting participants’
incorrect assumptions. As with the stereotype reduction videos, we predicted that challenging the stereotype of Muslims
as violent may reduce the tendency to blame all Muslims for
the violent actions of individual group members. In the activity (“Counterstereotyping”), participants were first asked to
guess statistics related to aggression by Muslims and refugees (e.g., the percent of European terror attacks in the past
10 years that had been perpetrated by Muslims). After guessing, participants were shown the true answer, which was consistently less in line with prevailing stereotypes than their
estimates. Specifically, the mean estimate for the percent of
European terror attacks committed by Muslims over a 5-year
period was 38.75% (SD = 31.92), and the correct response,
subsequently revealed, is less than 2% (more than 97% of the
sample overestimated the statistic). Similarly, of the 190,000
murders committed in the United Sates since 9/11, participants guessed that on average 5,042 (SD = 18,742) were
committed by Muslim extremists, whereas the correct answer
is 37 (more than 65% of participants overestimated); and of
the 194,000 refugees granted shelter in the United States
since 9/11, participants guessed on average that 899 (SD =
5,580) had committed murder, whereas the correct answer is
0 (more than 70% of participants overestimated).6 As part of
collectively blaming Muslims for violence likely involves
the stereotype that Muslims as a group are violent, we predicted that challenging this perception could potentially
reduce collective blame and anti-Muslim sentiments.
After completing one of the activities (or no activity in the
control condition), participants completed a survey that
included the key measure of collective blame, as well as blatant dehumanization, prejudice, and two downstream outcome measures: support for anti-Muslim policies and signing
anti-Muslim petitions.
Collective Blame was assessed as in Studies 1 and 2b (i.e.,
toward the Paris terror attacks).
Dehumanization was assessed as in Study 2b, by standardizing and then combining the trait measure (α = .91) and
the Ascent dehumanization measure (r = .55, p < .001).
Prejudice was assessed with feeling thermometers, and
expressed as the difference between warmth toward
Americans versus Muslims.
Anti-Muslim Policy Support (α = .94) was assessed as in
Studies 1, 2a, and 2b; Signing Anti-Muslim Petitions (α =
.87) was assessed as in Study 1.7

Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for
the control condition, see Table S6. Mean results for each
condition, ANOVAs, and t tests are presented in Table 5.
None of the measures differed across the Ingroup Guilt versus Ingroup Guilt+ interventions (ts < 1.3, ps > .20), so
results were collapsed across the two.
First, we assessed levels of blame attributed to oneself,
White Americans, and individual Muslims for those who
engaged in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity. We
found that self-blame for the three specific events was near
floor on the 100-point scale (M = 9.73, SD = 19.46).
Collective blame was similarly low for White Americans
across the three events (M = 9.73, SD = 18.64), for White
supremacists in the United States (M = 12.40, SD = 24.88)
and White supremacists in Europe (M = 9.59, SD = 19.86).
After assessing blame for themselves and White people,
Americans attributed very little blame to individual Muslims
(M = 8.65, SD = 22.28).
Next, we turned to the primary measure of interest: collective blame of Muslims. Overall, there was a main effect of
condition, F(4, 582) = 5.37, p < .001, η2 = .036, and planned
t tests revealed the predicted outcome: For participants who
participated in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity, collective blame of Muslims (M = 17.78, SD = 29.07) was half
what it was for controls, M = 35.46, SD = 37.59; t(302) =
4.12, p < .001, d = .47. Collective blame was also significantly lower for those who engaged in the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy activity than for those who took part in each of the
other activities (Ms = 35.01-36.93; ts > 3.7, ps < .001; see
Figure S6). There were also main effects for blatant dehumanization, anti-Muslim refugee policy support, and antiMuslim petition signing (see Table 5) that was driven by the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity: Compared with the
control condition, those who completed the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy activity reported less blatant dehumanization,
t(303) = 2.38, p = .016, d = .27, showed less anti-Muslim
refugee policy support, t(303) = 2.04, p = .042, d = .23, and
were less likely to sign anti-Muslim petitions, t(303) = 2.24,
p = .026, d = .26. Only prejudice was not significantly different for those in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy condition
versus no-activity controls, t(303) = 1.6, p = .11.
Aside from Hypocrisy, none of the other activities were
significantly different from the control condition for any of
the measures (ts < 1.6, ps > .10). See Table 5 for full results
across all conditions.
As with Studies 2a and 2b, we tested the sequential indirect
effect of the intervention (Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity)
versus no-activity control on outcomes, with collective blame as
a first mediator and dehumanization or prejudice (controlling for
the other) as a second mediator. Consistent with Studies 2a and
2b, there were significant indirect effects of condition on the outcome measures via collective blame (condition  CB  antiMuslim policies; condition  CB  anti-Muslim behavior).
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Table 5. Study 3a Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t tests Across Conditions.
Condition
Scale
No-activity controls
(N = 206)
Hypocrisy Activity
(N = 99)
Ingroup guilt
(N = 190)
Counterstereotype
(N = 98)
ANOVA
F(4, 582)
Independent t tests: t Hypocrisy vs. control
value (Cohen’s d)
t(303)
Hypocrisy vs. guilt
t(287)
Hypocrisy vs. counterstereo
t(195)
Guilt vs. control
t(394)
Challenge vs. control
t(302)

M (SD)

Collective
blame

Blatant
dehumanization

Prejudice

0-100
35.45
(37.59)
17.78
(29.07)
35.29
(35.59)
37.40
(36.23)
5.37***
η2 = .036
4.12***
(d = .47)
4.21***
(d = .50)
4.18***
(d = .60)
0.04

z score
0.117
(.928)
−0.148
(.875)
−0.023
(.830)
−0.052
(.785)
1.82

–100-+100
30.74
(36.39)
23.42
(39.10)
27.34
(36.54)
24.13
(35.16)
0.931

0.42

2.38*
(d = .27)
1.19

1.60
0.84

Support anti- Sign anti-Muslim
Muslim policies
petitions
1-7
3.87
(1.80)
3.43
(1.68)
3.78
(1.74)
3.57
(1.62)
1.41
2.04*
(d = .23)
1.65

–1-+1
−0.062
(.441)
−0.184
(.458)
−0.070
(.477)
−0.080
(.470)
1.73
2.24*
(d = .26)
1.94†
(d = .23)
1.57

0.81

0.13

.59

1.58

0.93

.50

0.19

1.56

1.50

1.41

0.33

Note. Counterstereo = Counterstereotype intervention.
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Also consistent with Studies 2a and 2b, there were significant
sequential indirect effects from the condition to each of
the outcomes via collective blame’s link to prejudice (condition  CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim policies; condition 
CB  prejudice  anti-Muslim behavior) and dehumanization
(condition  CB dehumanization  anti-Muslim policies;
condition  CB  dehumanization  anti-Muslim behavior).
Again consistent with Studies 2a and 2b, all the indirect effects
were mediated through collective blame: The indirect effects
of condition on outcomes through prejudice or dehumanization controlling for collective blame (i.e., condition  prejudice/dehumanization  outcomes) were all nonsignificant (all
95% confidential intervals [CIs] included 0). For results
regarding anti-Muslim behavior, see Figure 1 and Table 6. For
results regarding anti-Muslim policy support, see Figure S7
and Table S7.

Discussion
In sum, we followed up on the successful video intervention
from Studies 2a and 2b by targeting the specific mechanism
that we posited had been crucial to the video’s success (i.e.,
revealing hypocrisy in collective blame). In the interactive
activity, participants were required to first reflect on their own
(and White people’s) lack of collective responsibility for the
actions of individual group members. Subsequently, they
reported levels of collective blame of Muslims that were half

those reported in the control condition, thus avoiding potential
cognitive dissonance. Consistent with our theorizing about the
causal impact of collective blame, those who completed the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity reported lower levels of
prejudice and dehumanization, and were less likely to endorse
anti-Muslim policies, and sign anti-Muslim petitions, relative
to no-activity controls. All changes in outcomes were mediated by the activity’s effect on collective blame.

Study 3b
As with the video interventions tournament, we conducted a
follow-up study to replicate the effects from the activities
tournament. In Study 3b, we also examined a variant of the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity (“Hypocrisy+”). This
activity was identical to the Collective Blame Hypocrisy
activity, with one exception: After completing the activity,
participants in this condition were asked to report on (a) a
time when they thought they were responsible for the negative actions of an ingroup member, (b) a time when they
thought an outgroup member was responsible for the actions
of another outgroup member, and, finally, (c) whether they
found it easier to generate an example in which others (vs.
they themselves) were responsible for their group member’s
actions. We hypothesized that the additional reflection about
internal biases induced by completing these questions could
potentially accentuate the effects of the activity.
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Figure 1. Model testing the effect of condition (Control vs. Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity) on anti-Muslim behavior (signing antiMuslim petitions) through collective blame and either dehumanization or prejudice (while controlling for the other) for Study 3a.
Note. Unstandardized coefficients displayed.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 6. Study 3a.
Effects

Anti-Muslim petitions

Cond  CB  outcome
Cond  Dehum  outcome
Cond  Prejudice  outcome
Cond  CB  Dehum  outcome
Cond  CB  Prejudice  outcome
Total indirect (CB + Dehum)
Total indirect (CB + Prejudice)
Total direct
Total effect (CB + Dehum)
Total effect (CB + Prejudice)

–.042 [–.079, –.017]
−.002 [–.020, .013]
.005 [–.019, .033]
–.020 [–.043, –.004]
–.029 [–.053, –.013]
–.064 [–.109, –.026]
–.065 [–.119, –.018]
−.035 [–.130, .061]
−.081 [–.178, .016]
−.065 [–.164, .033]

Note. Unstandardized indirect, direct, and total effects of condition
(Cond) on behavior (signing anti-Muslim petitions) through sequential
mediators: Mediator 1 = collective blame (CB) and Mediator 2 =
dehumanization (Dehum; controlling for prejudice) or prejudice
(controlling for dehumanization). Results reported as point estimate with
95% confidence interval in brackets. Results in bold are significant: 95% CI
does not include 0. CI = confidential interval.

Method
Participants and design. Consistent with the previous studies,
we recruited 200 participants per each of three conditions. Of
the 600 people recruited, 15 failed an embedded check question, leaving 585 participants (346 female, Mage = 34.54,
SD = 11.50). The final sample was 48.4% Christian, 2.2%
Jewish, 1.7% Buddhist, 0.3% Hindu, 40.5% atheist/agnostic,

and 6.8% “Other.” Ethnically, the sample was 77.3% White,
5.1% Asian, 5.6% Hispanic, 6.2% Black, 0.9% Native American, 0.5% Middle Eastern, 4.1% biracial, and 0.3% “Other.”
Procedure and stimuli. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity was identical to the activity in Study 3a, with the following exception: Instead of asking how responsible White
Americans were for the actions of American and European
White extremists, we asked how responsible participants
thought mainstream Christians were for the actions of the
KKK.
Collective Blame was measured as in Study 2b (collective
blame of Muslims for the Brussels Airport attacks), Blatant
Dehumanization was measured with the trait measure of
dehumanization used in Studies 1, 2b, and 3a, and
Islamoprejudice was measured as in Studies 1, 2a, and 2b.8

Results
For descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations, see
Table S8. Mean results for each condition, ANOVAs, and t
tests are presented in Table 7.
Among those who engaged in the Hypocrisy activities,
self-blame was near floor on the 100-point scale (M = 4.74,
SD = 18.03), and collective blame of White Americans and
Christians was similarly very low (Whites: M = 9.78, SD =
17.84; Christians: M = 11.38, SD = 20.86). After assessing
blame for themselves, White people and Christians,
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Table 7. Study 3b Results: Means for All Measures Across Conditions, Omnibus ANOVAs, and Independent t Tests Across Conditions.
Condition

Means (SD)

Independent t tests: t
value (Cohen’s d)

Collective blame

Blatant dehumanization

Prejudice

Scale

0-100

1-7

0-100

No-activity controls
(N = 193)

34.10
(34.52)

3.55
(1.40)

38.40
(27.12)

Hypocrisy activity
(N = 199)
Hypocrisy + Activity
(N = 193)
ANOVA
F(2, 582)
Control vs. hypocrisy
t(390)
Control vs. hypocrisy+
t(581)
Control vs. hypocrisy (combined)
t(581)

11.70
(22.77)
9.29
(16.92)
54.38***
η2 = .158
7.61***
(d = .78)
8.93***
(d = .97)
10.39***
(d = .86)

3.27
(1.37)
3.20
(1.21)
3.88*
η2 = .013
2.04*
(d = .20)
2.67**
(d = .27)
2.74**
(d = .23)

33.73
(24.48)
32.13
(24.46)
3.19*
η2 = .011
1.79†
(d = .18)
2.39*
(d = .24)
2.45*
(d = .20)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Americans attributed very little blame to individual Muslims
(M = 2.65, SD = 10.53).
For the key collective blame measure, we found the predicted main effect of condition, F(2, 580) = 54.38, p < .001,
η2 = .16, and planned t tests confirmed that collective blame
of Muslims among those in the control condition (M =
34.10, SD = 34.52) was significantly greater than for those
who engaged either in the Collective Blame Hypocrisy
activity, M = 11.70, SD = 22.77; t(390) = 7.61, p < .001, d =
.78, or the Collective Blame Hypocrisy+ activity, M = 9.29,
SD = 16.92; t(382) = 8.93, p < .001, d = .97; see Table 7 and
Figure S8.
Although we hypothesized that the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy+ intervention might be significantly stronger than
the Hypocrisy intervention, the two conditions did not differ
from each other on any of the measures (ts < 1.2, ps > .23).
As collective blame of Muslims among those in the Hypocrisy
activity were just as low as collective blame of Christians
and Whites (and lower than observed in Study 3a), it is possible that the lack of difference between Collective Blame
Hypocrisy activities was due to a floor effect (i.e., the intergroup bias in collective blame was eliminated).
Also consistent with Study 3a, blatant dehumanization of
Muslims was significantly lower for those in the Collective
Blame Hypocrisy conditions (M = 3.23, SD = 1.29) versus controls, M = 3.55, SD = 1.40; t(583) = 2.74, p = .006, d = .23, and
those who engaged in a Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity
also expressed significantly less prejudice (M = 32.94, SD =
24.45) than controls, M = 38.40, SD = 27.12; t(583) = 2.45, p =
.015, d = .20. See Table 7 and Figure S8. Anti-Muslim policy
attitudes and behavior were not assessed in Study 3b.
Therefore, as with Study 3a, collective blame (and dehumanization) of Muslims was significantly reduced among
participants who engaged in one of two variants of the
Hypocrisy activity versus no-activity controls.

Figure 2. Results of meta-analysis across all participants who
were in either the hypocrisy intervention or control condition for
Studies 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.
Note. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean. Differences
between all groups p < .001. Reported are Cohen’s d effect sizes.

Meta-Analysis
Finally, to compare results across the Hypocrisy video
and Hypocrisy activities, we combined the results from the
Hypocrisy video and controls (Studies 2a and 2b) and the
Hypocrisy activities and controls (Studies 3a and 3b), and
performed a 2 modality (video, activity) × 2 condition (intervention, control) ANOVA with collective blame as the outcome. We found that there was a strong main effect of
condition, F(1, 1659) = 114.89, p < .001, η2 = .065, illustrating that the hypocrisy approach reliably reduces collective
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blame. We also found a significant Modality × Condition
interaction, F(1, 1659) = 19.12, p < .001, η2 = .011, such that
collective blame was reduced more by engaging in the
Collective Blame Hypocrisy activity (M = 11.99, SD = 22.22)
versus watching the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video (M =
20.92, SD = 27.75). See Figure 2.

General Discussion
Intergroup violence is a major cause of death and suffering
around the world. In 2014 alone, over 180,000 people died in
violent conflicts, and an estimated 50 million were displaced
(Armed Conflict Survey 2015, 2015). Understanding the psychological processes that feed conflict, and how to short-circuit these processes, may be critical to reducing human
suffering (see Kteily & Bruneau, 2017). Here, we examine one
process particularly relevant to conflict escalation—collective
blame—which can induce vicarious retribution against uninvolved outgroup members following an act of violence (Lickel
et al., 2006), and which we suggest can stimulate a conflict
spiral in intergroup contexts. Our work advances previous
research on the consequences of collective blame—which has
been examined largely in organizational settings—by showing
that collective blame of Muslims for terror attacks is associated with anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior.
Most importantly, we provide evidence that revealing the
hypocrisy of collectively blaming Muslims for acts of terrorism, but not collectively blaming White people or Christians
for individual acts of violence by members of those groups,
reliably reduces collective blame of Muslims, and thereby
decreases anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior associated
with vicarious retribution. The results were robust whether
the collective blame hypocrisy was revealed didactically in a
brief video or when revealed through a Socratic activity. In
both cases, the approaches highlighting hypocrisy in collective blame were numerically more effective than all other
alternative videos and activities and significantly more effective than most. The effects of the intervention were also not
obvious, as an independent sample of forecasters predicted
that the Collective Blame Hypocrisy video used in Studies 2a
and 2b would be completely ineffective—extending the literature on individuals’ poor forecasting of effective interventions (Cialdini, 2003) by showing that this also applies to
interventions aimed at reducing intergroup hostility.
Our findings contribute to a long tradition of research
demonstrating that highlighting hypocrisy can drive behavior change. The hypocrisy paradigm has been effective in
several contexts, increasing condom use (Aronson et al.,
1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994), the
recycling of household waste (Fried & Aronson, 1995),
and respect of traffic laws (Fointiat, 2004). Our data extend
this prior research, showing that similar results can also be
obtained when it comes to reducing collective blame and
improving intergroup attitudes and behaviors.
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At the same time, the cognitive dissonance literature has
also demonstrated that arguments highlighting hypocrisy and
other threats to self-worth can sometimes backfire. For
example, people have been shown to resolve the dissonance
between their support for environmental policies and recalling times when they wasted water in some cases by reducing
water usage (Dickerson et al., 1992), but in others by derogating the importance of water rationing policies (Liégeois,
Yserbyt, & Corneille, 2005). If a hypocrisy intervention
were to induce defensiveness—for example, by publicly
shaming the participants—it seems likely that it could exacerbate, rather than ease, the desired attitude or behavior.
Inductions of defensiveness may help to explain why some
of the interventions from the current research failed to reduce
collective blame or anti-Muslim attitudes and behavior, even
though they might have led to cognitive dissonance by highlighting hypocrisy or revealing incorrect beliefs. For example, Video 3 called out the hypocrisy of reporters viewing all
Muslim countries as the same (and not doing this with
Christian countries), and Video 8 implied hypocrisy by having people respond to passages that were purportedly from
the Quran, but were in fact revealed to be from the Bible.
These approaches could not only invoke hypocrisy but also
involve an element of public shaming or combativeness. It is
possible that the combativeness reduces their efficacy.
By contrast, the didactic approach in the Collective Blame
Hypocrisy video does not call out the hypocrisy of the interviewer, but reveals it as a view held by unnamed others. The
Socratic approach in the activity is even more gentle, allowing
participants to proactively avoid reporting any hypocrisy
themselves. It would be interesting to see if adjusting the other
potentially threatening interventions could render them more
successful. For example, the “Counter-Stereotype” activity
intervention from Study 3a could allow participants to discover the statistics about refugee violence on their own, rather
than correcting them after their erroneous predictions. Because
these interventions were chosen from popular approaches,
were not explicitly designed to test particular theories, and
might have been effective had they been presented in different
ways, we think it important to emphasize that the absence of
effects here for some of the interventions should not be held as
evidence against a psychological approach to which they were
mapped (e.g., counterstereotyping).
Although the principal focus of this research was on interventions aimed at reducing collective blame and other antiMuslim sentiments, it is also worth highlighting the
“effectiveness” of the negative control video at increasing collective blame attributions (and anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support). From a theoretical perspective, the fact that this
intervention increased downstream hostility via collective
blame provides further confidence in our proposed model: Just
as reducing collective blame can reduce dehumanization and
prejudice with consequences for outcomes like support for
anti-Muslim policies, increasing collective blame can do the
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reverse. From a practical perspective, the fact that a brief video
can dramatically and reliably increase anti-Muslim sentiments
highlights concerns about the anti-Muslim rhetoric increasingly prevalent on certain media platforms and frequently promulgated by the current U.S. president (Kteily & Bruneau,
2017). At the very least, the effectiveness of the negative control at increasing anti-Muslim hostility suggests that a great
need for countermessaging exists. Determining what types of
messages (including collective blame hypocrisy and beyond)
might protect against or mitigate the negative effects of a compelling narrative that includes anti-Muslim speech represents
an important avenue of future research.

Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the consistent and robust results from this research,
it is important to note some limitations. First, it is important
to acknowledge that the results were obtained exclusively
from samples obtained through Mechanical Turk. Although
mTurk samples are reliable and diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang,
& Gosling, 2011), it is possible that other populations may
respond differently. For example, very liberal samples (e.g.,
psychology undergraduates) may be near floor in collective
blame to begin with, which would minimize or eliminate the
efficacy of the intervention.
Second, still more work is required to better understand the
psychological mechanisms behind the collective blame hypocrisy approach. Although the approach is similar to cognitive
dissonance hypocrisy paradigms, there are some key differences that may reveal significant disparities between the effectiveness of these approaches in the intergroup context. For
example, the strength of cognitive dissonance hypocrisy paradigms is enhanced when cognitive dissonance (and therefore
internal discomfort) is maximized (Fried & Aronson, 1995).
By contrast, the collective blame hypocrisy activity allows
people to preemptively avoid cognitive dissonance. Allowing
cognitive dissonance to establish itself first, for example, by
having people declare their collective blame of Muslims
before being exposed to an argument about hypocrisy in collective blame, might reduce the efficacy of the intervention by
making people feel defensive and/or “trapped.” These predictions should be tested in future research.
Third, we demonstrate here effects immediately following the interventions; future research should establish how
long the effects of the intervention last.
Fourth, the results reported here refer to a single target
group. Although collective blame of Muslims is an important
phenomenon that could be driving some of the most pressing
contemporary violence in the United States today (mass violence by Muslim extremists and anti-Muslim hate crimes,
which are mutually reciprocal), it will be important in the
future to extend these results to other groups. For example, it
will be important to see if the degree to which marginalized
groups like African Americans in the United States and the
Roma in Europe are collectively blamed for violence and drug
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abuse/trafficking, and whether this perception can similarly be
reduced through the collective blame hypocrisy approach.
Finally, it is worth acknowledging the variable strength of
the evidence for the direct effects of the interventions on the
outcome measures, and discussing the causal ordering
implied by our model. The Collective Blame Hypocrisy
video and interactive activity very consistently influenced
levels of collective blame across all studies. The interventions also reduced prejudice in Studies 2b and 3b (but marginally in Study 2a and not in Study 3a) and dehumanization
in Studies 3a and 3b (but marginally in Study 2b and not in
Study 2a). On the contrary, despite the significant indirect
effects of the hypocrisy intervention on anti-Muslim policy
support and anti-Muslim behavior via collective blame and
prejudice/dehumanization in all studies, only the Socratic
activity (and not the video) exerted direct effects on these
outcomes. The fact that our manipulation of collective blame
had stronger direct effects on prejudice and dehumanization
than on anti-Muslim policies and behavior is consistent with
our model of attitudes and beliefs about Muslims as more
proximal than policy support and behavior. At the same time,
although we provided causal evidence that manipulating
hypocrisy produced downstream effects on prejudice, dehumanization, and policy attitudes and behavior via collective
blame, we did not explicitly test the causal relationship
between prejudice/dehumanization and the policy attitudes
and behavior. That part of our model therefore remains more
tentative, requiring confirmatory research.

Conclusion
In sum, we established causal relationships between revealing
the hypocrisy of collectively blaming some groups more than
others for the acts of individuals and reducing collective blame
of Muslims for individual terror attacks. In turn, we found
across all studies that changes in collective blame mediated
the relationship between intervention exposure and downstream policy support and behaviors associated with vicarious
retribution, both directly and through collective blame’s link
to anti-Muslim prejudice and dehumanization. Taken together,
our results highlight the importance of collective blame in
intergroup conflict and show that making people aware of the
hypocrisy inherent in blaming some groups more than others
for the actions of individual outgroup members can mitigate
collective blame and diminish downstream consequences
associated with vicarious retribution.
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Notes
1. Due to the high number of experimental conditions, we did not
correct for multiple comparisons in Study 2a (which would have
resulted in a highly conservative threshold). Instead, we opted to
confirm any significant results with a replication study (Study 2b).
2. Included in the survey for other purposes, but not analyzed here,
were measures of socioeconomic status, social dominance orientation (SDO), conservatism, media consumption, and support
for 2016 American presidential candidates.
3. Examining the negative control versus controls yielded similar
results, in the opposite direction.
4. Included in the survey for other purposes, but not analyzed further here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational
attainment, media consumption, and support for 2016 American
presidential candidates.
5. Examining the negative control versus controls yielded similar
results, in the opposite direction.
6. All subsequent analyses for this condition are similar for those
who overestimated Muslim violence on one or all items, and
those who did not overestimate on any.
7. Included in the survey for exploratory purposes, but not analyzed
further here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational
attainment, employment, political conservatism, SDO, rightwing authoritarianism (RWA), and need for cognition (NFC).
8. Included in the survey for exploratory purposes, but not analyzed here, were measures of socioeconomic status, educational
attainment, employment, conservatism, SDO, RWA, NFC, and
support for 2016 American presidential candidates.
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Supplementary material is available online with this article.
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